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DCI/RMS 79-2305

07 AUG 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

[REDACTED]

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Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support to Strategic Forces [REDACTED]

25X1

REFERENCE: Memorandum from Gen. Brown to DCI, dtd 7 July 1979,
Same Subject

1. Action Requested: That you sign the attached response to General Brown's memorandum (see Reference) on the Program Assessment Office (PAO) study, "Intelligence Support to Strategic Forces." [REDACTED]

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2. Background:

a. General Brown sent general comments on the study to you. (He sent his general and specific comments to [REDACTED] the Director of PAO, who led this study.) [REDACTED]

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b. The comments received on the study reflect the commonly observed fact that the further you are from Omaha, the more flexible the strategic forces appear. Neither JSTPS nor SAC in their comments (which we sent to you with the study) voiced General Brown's view that our current strategic forces could rapidly and flexibly be reprogrammed for attack if only they had sufficient intelligence support. This optimistic estimate of our force's capability does, however, underlie comments from elsewhere in the Pentagon, such as JCS and USD (Policy). [REDACTED]

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c. PAO is continuing its work on support to strategic forces to define the resource implications of a decision to make the strategic forces more flexible (e.g., to be able to target mobile forces with rapidly replanned attack options). [REDACTED]

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Attachment:

Proposed Letter to Gen. Brown

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

AUG 9 1979

Major General James L. Brown, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D.C. 20330

Dear Jim:

Thank you for your thoughtful comments on the draft study prepared by my staff on Intelligence Support to Strategic Forces. I share your view of the importance of the intelligence support provided to our strategic forces and also believe that intelligence support can be improved in important ways. For example, current strategic force employment will be enhanced by ongoing analyses of such key target data base elements as leadership relocation facilities and population estimates for small towns and rural areas. Furthermore, our confidence in the maintenance of our strategic force effectiveness will be increased as we improve our capability to collect information on Soviet advanced R&D programs. This will provide longer lead-time for U.S. response to Soviet initiatives, e.g., lead-time for changes in targeting, changes in operational tactics, and acquisition of new capabilities. ☐

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Attacking mobile forces and being prepared to fight a protracted nuclear war with flexibility remain important issues. Recent DoD studies, and discussions in the SCC, have addressed possible changes in current strategic force employment policy to include attacks on fleeting targets as well as replanning for repeated attacks. If such changes were made, as the study notes, then substantial new needs for enduring, near-real-time intelligence capabilities would result. However, such improved intelligence capabilities would, I believe, have little value without accompanying major improvements in the strategic forces and their supporting systems, e.g., command, control, and communications. ☐

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Obviously, it is very important that we work together to ensure that policy, intelligence resources, and other capabilities link together smoothly. ☐

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Yours,

SIGNED

STANSFIELD TURNER

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